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It is often supposed that a person is not required to do anything they
cannot do. “Ought” implies “can,” as this is often put. Let’s accept that
for the sake of argument. Still, it is not obvious that if I can’t muster the
will to do something, then I can’t do it. An inability to will an action might
not entail an inability to do the action, in which case the action might yet
be required. I will discuss this question shortly. In any case, here is a
related but different idea: even if it is not impossible to do whatever it is
impossible to muster the will to do, perhaps it is still implausible to think
one could be required to do what one could not muster the will to do.
Perhaps we should accept that “ought” implies “can will.” If so, and if
there are characteristic things that humans cannot muster the will to do,
then human nature (in the sense of the limits of human motivational
capacities) would stand as a prior set of facts that constrain what political
philosophy can soundly prescribe or morally require.
My thesis, simply stated, is that this is not so. If there are facts of
human nature of this general kind, consisting in limits to what humans
will be able to muster the will to do, they are not, simply as facts, con-
straints on what can soundly be prescribed or morally required. The
reason is that agents’ abilities and inabilities to muster their will are
subject to moral evaluation in their own right. Some such inabilities are
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morally objectionable, others are not. The fact that some men cannot
stand to be at a business meeting with a woman is a fact that must be
taken as a constraint in certain practical contexts. It does not, however,
force the retraction of a moral requirement to participate in meetings
without gender discrimination. Nor would the fact, if it were one (which
I doubt), that male sentiments of this kind are part of human nature
refute a theory according to which the male-imposed exclusion of
women from the halls of economic power is unjust. I want to argue that
human nature—more specifically, whatever motivational incapacities
are possessed by humans as such—is a constraint on some tasks in
political philosophy but not on others. It is not a general constraint on
political philosophy.
i. the human nature constraint
Here is the common position that I will argue against:
The human nature constraint: A normative political theory is defective
and thus false if it imposes standards or requirements that ignore
human nature—that is, requirements that will not, owing to human
nature and the motivational incapacities it entails, ever be satisfied.
Equally familiar and traditional is a certain way of responding to such
charges. An example—one that I will use throughout my argument—is
the charge that Marxist and other socialist and egalitarian political theo-
ries have long been burdened with: that humans, in their nature, are not
and never will be like that. The response to this charge has often been to
accept the human nature constraint on political theorizing but deny that
human nature is as the critics charge. For example, it is sometimes said
that humans as we have observed them up to this point in history might
be more partial and selfish than socialist theory would require, but that
such observations would not show that our nature is such that this will
continue.1 I will not be engaging in this kind of dispute about what is or
is not in human nature. Rather, I will argue against the constraint itself.
It is important to acknowledge that the term “human nature” can be
used to refer to other things about humans, such as their biological
1. See, e.g., Joseph Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 104.
208 Philosophy & Public Affairs
needs or their tendency to age. I am using the term in the narrower way
I have indicated. However, disputes about whether political philosophy
properly respects human nature are not normally about issues like our
need for oxygen or our tendency to age. What political philosopher puts
these aside? Traditionally, the disputes are very often about allegedly
characteristic human structures of motivation, and especially about par-
tiality and selfishness. I am engaging this traditional and central line of
dispute about the relevance of human nature to political philosophy.
To keep things simple, I will grant for the sake of argument that it is in
the nature of humans to be more selfish and partial than socialist or
egalitarian (or whatever other) theory would need them to be. I deny,
however, that this refutes any such normative political theories. Far from
taking a stand on the content of human nature, it would be open to me
to deny that there is such a thing as human nature at all. But I will grant
it for the sake of argument. Some have suggested that philosophical
criticism is often in one or the other of two categories: “Oh yeah?” or “So
what?”2 When a political theory is alleged to violate the bounds of human
nature, many have responded with “Oh yeah?” My response, by contrast,
is “So what?”
The appeal to human nature suggests something more than merely
making claims about how people will act or are likely to act. The sugges-
tion seems to be that there are, in addition, forces at work. But let’s
consider the weaker claim first, that people (simply) won’t act as the
theory requires.3 In addition to the example of socialist or egalitarian
theory, it might be held against a theory requiring significant civic virtue
that, for example, people will never do that. It’s hard to see how this is an
objection. It would not surprise any of us if people will never be very
good or if societies will never be very just. But that very thought requires
reference to a standard not met. To show (supposing that one can show
it) that a standard will not be met might count against people’s behavior
rather than against the standard. Of course, it may be that the thought
embodied in such a complaint is that if people won’t do it, or if we can
2. Nicholas Sturgeon reports this observation as lore among Cornell graduate students.
See “What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?” supplement, The
Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (1986).
3. Here I go through some points from “Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in
Democratic Theory,” chapter 14 of my Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).
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know in advance that they won’t, then maybe this is because they can’t.
Then, if “ought” implies “can,” that would refute the theory. If people
can’t do it, then they are not required, and the theory that says they are
required is thereby refuted.
“Ought” implies “can” is a formula that stands for a number of sepa-
rable ideas. I want to grant, for the sake of argument, that some version
of it could refute a theory of justice. So let’s say that if a theory says that
a society would be unjust unless it met certain conditions, then that
theory of justice would be false if the society lacked the ability to meet
those conditions.4 This is debatable, but even if we grant it, there is no
basis for supposing that what people won’t do is something they cannot
do. People and societies fail to do things they should and could do (even
do easily) all the time. If it could be shown that a society lacks the ability
to meet a theory’s requirements, then I will grant for the sake of argu-
ment that the theory would be defeated. But knowing that society will
never do certain things is a long way from having any basis for thinking
that it lacks the ability.
Here is an important point to keep in mind, if only in the background.
For present purposes, when we ask ourselves whether a person can do
something, we should not be assuming that causal determinism pre-
vents it. If every event, including every action, is necessitated by causal
antecedents, showing that nothing is ever required other than what we
actually do, then the issue about justice and human nature isn’t of any
further interest. This would not be the view that requirements of justice
must stay within the bounds of human nature, but the view that they
must stay within the bounds of what people and societies actually do. I
will be assuming that either determinism is not true or (what seems more
likely) that people can often do other than what they actually do even if
determinism is true. For example, it might be that a person can do some-
thing only so long as they would tend to succeed if they were to try and
not give up. That counterfactual situation might obtain even if it is not
possible that they try. For example, it is causally guaranteed that Joe,
being so uncaring, will never try to help his neighbor. Still, if he were to
try, he would tend to succeed, so it is not as if he can’t help her. This sort
4. My concern, then, is with requirements on societies as such. Much will depend on
points about abilities and motivational capacities of individuals, however, and in Section 11
I will be more explicit about the relations between these questions.
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of view is “compatibilist,” in that it claims, compatibly with causal deter-
minism, that people can often do other than what they actually do. (And
if they can, then they might be required to.)
A second important background point concerns oppressive threats
and incentives. What people can bring themselves to do is very often
relative to an environment of threats and incentives. In many cases, what
look like motivational incapacities—whether they are morally unfortu-
nate or not—can be overcome by structuring those threats and incen-
tives. In a subset of cases that require inducement, only oppressive
threats and incentives would be effective. (I do not assume that coercion,
which law normally involves, is always oppressive and wrong.) Even
where the initial motivations are themselves shortfalls from what is nec-
essary for justice (such as weakness of will or willing vice), obviously not
just any inducement, however oppressive, would be morally permitted.
Many inducements would often only substitute one injustice for
another. Nor, however, does the fact that the oppressive inducement
should be forgone somehow erase the injustice of the behavior that will
result. Just because we shouldn’t amputate the hands of thieves to eradi-
cate theft (supposing it would) doesn’t mean that the theft itself is per-
missible or that a society rife with it is just. Similarly, just because we
shouldn’t incarcerate and “reeducate” people who perpetuate bigotry
(supposing that would work) doesn’t mean that resulting high levels of
bigotry are compatible with a just society.
So, returning to the main thread, suppose that “ought” implies “can.”
Plainly, “ought” does not imply “will” (unless people can only do what
they will do, a possibility we are putting aside). So, putting the same
points the other way around, “can’t do” is requirement-blocking, but
“won’t do” is not.
ii. what humans can’twill
I hear appeals to human nature as something more than predictions, as
suggesting that, in addition, there are forces at work. Often, the more
specific suggestion, and the one I will concentrate on, is that the reason
people won’t behave in some way is that they are not motivationally
made up that way. That is, because of their motivational natures they are
unable to get themselves to do so. Consider Plato’s theory of justice,
part of which requires parents to permanently surrender their infants to
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community care and upbringing.5 This might be requiring something
contrary to human nature in the following respect: many parents,
however persuaded they might be by the conception of justice, might
find themselves unable to bring themselves to do it. Or consider a theory
that requires people to devote their time and skills impartially to the
common good rather than to personal benefit. Even people who accept
this conception of justice would, perhaps, still find themselves unable to
bring themselves to comply. This motivational incapacity might be in the
very nature of human beings.
Call these examples cases of an inability to will the action. We have
spoken of “won’t do” cases, which are not requirement-blocking, and
“can’t do” cases, which we will grant are requirement-blocking. What
about “can’t will” cases? Are they requirement-blocking? Even if they are
not requirement-blocking in individual cases, what about cases in which
humans, by their very nature, can’t will? Is this requirement-blocking?
In “can’t will” cases, there might not be any obstacle to the agent’s
complying except the structure of the agent’s own motivation. On one
hand, this might be a reason for supposing that the motivational inca-
pacity does not change the fact that the agent can do the action. She
would succeed at doing it if only she thoroughly willed to do it or tried
and didn’t give up, and that might be a perfectly good interpretation of
“can do,” even if she “can’t will.” On the other hand, if she is incapable of
mustering the will all the way through to action, then she might not
succeed at doing the action she wants to do. So, that is some basis for
supposing that if she can’t will it, then she can’t do it. Which is it? Does
“can’t will” imply “can’t do” or not?
It will be helpful to have a working account of what it means to say that
a person can do, or is able to do something—I will use those interchange-
ably. I propose, as previously suggested, the following:
A person is able to (can) do something if and only if, were she to try
and not give up, she would tend to succeed.
The mere fact that it is possible that I do something doesn’t establish that
I am able. It is possible that I draw a jack of hearts from a shuffled deck in
a single draw, but I don’t have the ability to do so. Actuality proves
possibility, but not ability. Even if I try without giving up, I will not tend
5. Plato, Republic, bk. 5, lines 457c–d.
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to succeed. The same goes for staying awake for four days straight,
and much else that is not beyond possibility. A person might
sometimes be able to do something even if she is unable to bring
herself to do it—even if she has that motivational incapacity.
She will tend to give up, but if she had not given up, she would
have tended to succeed.
Notice that we took for granted that if “ought” implies “can,” and
“can’t will” implies “can’t do,” then “ought” would imply “can will.” That
is, if a person is unable to bring herself to do something even if there are
no other obstacles, then she is not required to do that thing. “Can’t will”
would be requirement-blocking. And if humans have, by their natures,
certain motivational incapacities such as those associated with the
parental bond or with ineluctable self-concern or partiality, then
normative political theory that required behavior incompatible
with those facts about human nature would be refuted. All this hangs
on whether we agree that “can’t will” implies “can’t do” (assuming
“ought” implies “can”).
Since I propose to argue that “can’t will,” even when it is part of
human nature, is not requirement-blocking, I must hold either that
“can’t will” does not imply “can’t do” or, if it does, deny that “ought”
implies “can.” Indeed, since I’m granting that “ought” implies “can,” I
must hold that the inability to bring oneself to do something (to will to do
it) might coexist with an ability to do that thing. I must hold this because
otherwise motivational incapacity would be requirement-blocking after
all. But denying that is my central thesis. I have not argued for that thesis
yet, but it is important at this stage to ask the reader to leave open the
question whether “can’t will” implies “can’t do.” I grant that we some-
times say things such as “I can’t” in cases where, apart from our own
motivational structures, there is no obstacle at all to our doing the action.
We might say this when we are in the grip of fear, or revulsion, or a
contrary temptation, for example. But it would be hasty to let this way of
talking convince us that these are genuine inabilities to do those actions,
since, if “ought” implies “can,” we will hastily be committing ourselves to
the moral position that there is no requirement to do them. To postpone
that moral question, we should, I think, remain open to supposing that
these agents can still do these actions even if they can’t will them or
“bring themselves” to do them. We’ll come back to this point after I have
argued that even motivational incapacities that are part of human nature
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(if any) are not requirement-blocking—that is, that “ought” does not
imply “can will.”
Our question is this: does it refute a requirement if it is shown that the
agent, while (at least in all other respects) able to do the action, is unable
to will it—unable to bring herself to do it? I take this to be one central
meaning for the charge that certain theories of, say, justice fail to respect
human nature with its characteristic selfishness or partiality.
iii. human nature vs. a socialist theory of justice
Let’s look at a specific theory of justice that requires a strong kind of
impartiality or selflessness. Joseph Carens has invented a fascinating and
(he admits) utopian social arrangement.6 His guiding question is how
distributive equality might be compatible with both efficiency and indi-
vidual freedom. He doesn’t assess these desiderata, alone or together,
as principles of justice, although it will be useful for our purposes to
think of them in that way. I simplify things for my own purposes
here, but there are essentially three parts to Carens’s reconciliation of
these three desiderata:
(1) The underlying distributive principle is equality of income, along
with principles about individual freedom.
(2) Institutionally, there is taxation or another means of redistribut-
ing income that is earned in the familiar market manner, so that
income is equal (this can be measured per household or per indi-
vidual, it doesn’t matter here).
(3) Finally, there is a behavioral requirement: citizens are required to
devote themselves to maximizing their pretax income, even
knowing that it will be redistributed equally.
Carens’s interest in this kind of market was about the advantages of
markets. My interest is in an interesting feature of such a conception of
social justice. Call the theory that society ought to implement and
comply with the Carens Market the “Pretax Max” theory of justice.
Carens characterizes the theory as “utopian” to signal that he does not
believe it to be relevant to actual policy in any existing society.7 He does
6. Carens, Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
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argue, however, that there is reason to believe that with proper social-
ization people might well develop the motivational and behavioral char-
acters needed for the reconciliation of equality, efficiency, and freedom.
Suppose, however, that people, in virtue of human nature, would not
be able to get themselves to comply. Suppose people can’t, even with the
most propitious socialization, bring themselves to devote their energies
to the common good in this way—they can’t fully will it. Would that be
requirement-blocking, thus refuting the Pretax Max theory of justice? I
will argue that it would not.
It is important to acknowledge that any institutional proposal that
ignores the facts about how people will actually tend to behave is worth-
less. It might seem as though the Carens Market is an institutional
proposal and, as such, worthless for this reason. However, the Carens
Market is not proposed by Carens for actual implementation under any-
thing like actual or foreseeable circumstances. It is not an institutional
proposal. So, even if actual behavior would make such institutions a
disaster, that is no objection to the theory.
But if the Carens Market is not an institutional proposal, what is it? It
doesn’t look like a fundamental principle of justice, a status held,
perhaps, by the egalitarian principle of distribution. It is institutional,
but not a proposal. To understand its status better, it will be helpful first
to introduce Professor Procrastinate.
iv. interlude: professor procrastinate
Following Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, consider the case of Pro-
fessor Procrastinate.8 He is duty-bound to accept and complete an
assignment to write a book review for a journal. (Suppose he owes the
journal, or he promised, or whatever.) But he is the sort of person who,
even if he accepts the assignment, will put it off and never do it. Should
he accept the assignment? Many agree with Jackson and Pargetter that
Procrastinate ought not to accept. This forces them, awkwardly, to
accept both that he ought not to accept the assignment, and also that he
ought to accept and perform the assignment. If you hold that this is not
only awkward but self-contradictory, then you would be making a logical
8. Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, “Oughts, Options, and Actualism,” Philosophi-
cal Review 95 (1986): 233–55.
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objection.9 Accordingly, Jackson and Pargetter defend the consistency of
these seemingly discordant positions with the following claim about the
logic of “ought” statements: “ought” does not distribute over conjuncts.
That is, even if it ought to be the case that A and B, it does not follow, as
it might at first seem to follow, that it ought to be the case that A. That
would be to treat “ought” distributively, and this is what they reject. By
rejecting it, they save their claim that the professor ought not to accept
the assignment, even though he ought to accept it and perform it. If
“ought” were distributive, then it would of course be problematic to say
both that he ought to accept and perform and that he ought not to
accept. For my purposes, all that matters is that distributivity should be
rejected, not whether it is correct to say that Procrastinate ought not to
accept. I will have to wait to explain why that is so, but for now I want to
argue briefly that distributivity is properly rejected, leaving a fuller dis-
cussion to another occasion.
This issue is closely related to the familiar “problem of second-best.”
When there are several desiderata that are desirable as a package, if one
of them is not satisfied, the value of the rest of them is thrown back into
question.10 More generally, values are often holistic in this way. It is good
to have steak sauce and steak. Is it good to have steak sauce? Not neces-
sarily. It depends on whether you will also be having steak. Reflection on
this very general structure of values is, I believe, a strong answer to the
understandable impression that if Professor Procrastinate ought to
accept and perform, then it would be contradictory to say that he ought
not to accept.
The Professor Procrastinate example was devised not only to dispute
the principle of distributivity, but also to support the case for “actual-
ism,” the view that a person ought to perform whichever action is such
that things will turn out best given what will actually happen (i.e., he
won’t perform) rather than what could happen (i.e., he could perform
even though he won’t), as “possibilists” argue. This is not the place to
9. It is only self-contradictory if deontic dilemmas are logically impossible, which is
controversial. A weaker objection would be that distributivity would lead to a deontic
dilemma where, intuitively, there is none. The denial of distributivity, as discussed in the
next sentences, would respond to either form of the objection.
10. The classic statement, formulated in economic terms, is R. G. Lipsey and Kelvin
Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” The Review of Economic Studies 24
(1956–1957): 11–32.
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explicate, much less attempt to settle, the dispute between philosophers
who agree with Jackson and Pargetter that Procrastinate ought not to
accept the assignment (“actualists”) and others who argue that he ought
indeed to accept (“possibilists”).11 I take no position on that, but only on
the narrower question of whether “ought” is logically distributive over
the components of a conjunction. This does not commit me to actualism
for the following reason. It is not necessary to agree with the actualists
that Procrastinate ought not to accept in order to hold the following two
things that I want to hold: First, contrary to the principle of distributivity,
it doesn’t follow from the requirement to do A and B that he is required
to do A. He might or might not be required, but nothing can be inferred
about this from the conjunctive requirement. Second, if someone holds
that society ought not to implement some arrangement (call this imple-
mentation A), this would not refute a theory of justice according to which
society ought to implement the arrangement and comply with it (call the
compliance B), since “ought” is not distributive. So, I am not siding with
or against the actualists, who argue that Procrastinate ought not to
accept. I am holding only that if Procrastinate ought not to accept, this
leaves open the possibility that, nevertheless, he ought to accept and
perform. So, in the case of the Pretax Max theory, I am not arguing that it
ought not to be implemented (supposing, for argumentative purposes,
that the theory is true). My position is only that even if, as many will
believe, it ought not to be implemented because it will not be complied
with, the claim that it ought to be implemented and complied with is
not contradicted. So, the fact, if it is one, that we shouldn’t institute
the Carens Market because people won’t comply doesn’t refute the
theory of justice.
We can now return to our earlier question: if the Carens
Market is not an institutional proposal, what is it? Let’s distinguish
between three things:
Fundamental political principles: These are abstract principles
without institutional content such as a distributive pattern (equality,
11. For two recent short discussions, see Christopher Woodard, “What’s Wrong with
Possibilism,” Analysis 69 (2009): 219–26; and Ralph Wedgewood, “Against Actualism,”
PEA Soup, <http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2009/09/against-actualism.html>.
Accessed February 10, 2010.
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priority, sufficiency, and the like), historical principles (free transfer,
legislative proceduralism, and the like), or combinations of these.
At the more institutional end of the spectrum:
Institutional proposals: These propose the implementation of rules
and arrangements such as election and legislation procedure, eco-
nomic rules and regulations, laws of property, marriage, employment,
and much else.
Distinct from either fundamental principles or institutional proposals is
what I shall call:
Institutional principles: An institutional principle describes institu-
tional arrangements as part of a broader prescription or proposal,
even if the described arrangement itself is not proposed or prescribed.
In the form that matters for our purposes, an institution might be
described as one that ought to be instituted and complied with, even
if, because it will not be complied with, it ought not to be instituted.
Thus, it is not an institutional proposal.
The Carens Market is a case of institutional principle. It is institutional
but it is not a proposal to build the institutions—because they won’t
be complied with.
Summing up this point: the Pretax Max theory requires us to imple-
ment and comply with a Carens Market. It is observed that we will not
comply with it, and so we ought not to implement it. But we still ought to
build and comply with it, and so the Pretax Max theory of justice and all
its requirements are intact. It never did require us to implement a Carens
Market. It required the more involved thing: implement and comply. In
general, my claim is that institutional principles, which tell us to build
and comply, are unlike institutional proposals because they are not
refuted by any facts about whether people will build or comply with them.
But what about human nature? This discussion of the Carens Market
has so far not engaged with the questions about human nature that are
my central topic. We have, for the moment, only considered the fact that
people won’t do as the Pretax Max theory requires. As we saw earlier, that
fact would not block the requirement. Our question is whether a certain
stronger claim is requirement-blocking, namely, the claim that people,
by virtue of human nature, are unable to bring themselves (at least in
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sufficient numbers) to behave in the impartial and energetic way that
theory requires: maximizing pretax income when it will be redistributed
equally. So, the position to be contended with is not only that we
shouldn’t implement the Carens Market (a claim that is compatible with
the truth of the theory of justice), but also that the theory of justice is false
anyway. The argument I have in mind goes like this:
It’s not only that people won’t comply with such a market. That would
allow that the theory of justice might be true even though, knowing
what we do about people, we ought not to implement it. It is worse
than that for the theory. It is human nature to be more self-interested
than that. That is, it is not just a prediction but a claim about some-
thing in us that explains our behavior, namely, a characteristic moti-
vational inability to will to behave that way. This refutes the theory
of justice because theories of justice must respect such facts
about human nature.
Recall that we have considered “can’t do” and we allow that it is
requirement-blocking. We looked at “won’t do” and concluded that it is
not requirement-blocking. We are now looking at “can’t will.” The ques-
tion is whether this is requirement-blocking.
v. selfishness is not requirement-blocking, and typicality
adds nothing
There is important variety among cases in which people can’t bring
themselves to act in certain ways. Some cases are “clinical,” such as
addictions, phobias, compulsions, and the like. I will put these cases
aside and allow that, for all I say, it might be that some such cases are
indeed requirement-blocking. I don’t need to take a stand on this
because I will assume that any motivational inabilities that are part of
human nature are not in that (admittedly vague and intuitively defined)
category. It is only these characteristically human motivational incapaci-
ties that I will argue are not requirement-blocking. In particular, I con-
centrate on (what I grant for the sake of argument to be) characteristic
and essential human selfishness.
Before looking at characteristic and essential human selfishness, let’s
look at the selfishness of a single person. Consider a plausible moral
requirement to refrain from dumping your household garbage by the
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side of the road. Suppose Bill pleads that he is not required to refrain
from dumping because he is motivationally unable to bring himself to do
it. There is no special phobia, compulsion, or illness involved. He is
simply deeply selfish and so cannot thoroughly will to comply. Dumping
his trash by the road is easier than wrapping it properly and putting it by
the curb or taking it to the dump. He wishes he had more willpower, and
yet he doesn’t have it. Refraining is something he could, in all other
respects, easily do, except that he can’t thoroughly will to do it. It would
be silly for Bill to propose this as requirement-blocking. This motiva-
tional incapacity is patently powerless to block the requirement in the
individual case. (Notice that if we had let “can’t will” count as “can’t do,”
then the principle that “ought” implies “can” would have yielded the
answer that the requirement is blocked here. This is counterintuitive,
and there is no sufficiently weighty reason to proceed in that way in light
of this implication.) If Bill’s selfishness doesn’t block that requirement,
the reason is that it simply doesn’t block any requirements. If, in addi-
tion, he is too selfish to comply with a Carens Market, then this is again
no challenge to that institutional principle or the associated theory of
justice at all. I allow, for the sake of argument, that some requirements
are refuted by their being too burdensome or demanding, or some such
thing, and I will return to the question whether this is itself a concession
to human motivation incapacities (hint: no).
I said there were two parts to the idea that a Carens Market requires
things that are incompatible with human nature. The first part is a claim
of motivational inability due to selfishness. I have argued that in an
individual case this is not requirement-blocking. The second element is
the claim, which we are granting for the sake of argument, that this
motivational inability is typical (or even essentially typical) of humans.
So, even if the inability is not requirement-blocking in an individual case,
what about if it is typical of humans, or even of humans as such? I see no
reason to say anything other than that:
Typicality adds nothing: If S’s being unable to will Ø is not
requirement-blocking, then this is still the case if all humans are (even
essentially) like S in this respect.
Suppose people line up to get your moral opinion on their behavior. Bill
is told that his selfishness is indeed a motivational incapacity, but that it
does not exempt him from the requirement to be less selfish. But behind
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Bill comes Nina with the same query. Again, we dispatch her, on the
same grounds as Bill. Behind Nina is Kim, and so on. Since each poses
the same case, our judgment is the same. The line might contain all
humans, but that fact adds nothing to any individual’s case. I take this to
show that even if the reason people will not comply with a Carens Market
is because there is a motivational inability to do so that is part of human
nature, this is not requirement-blocking and so does not refute the
theory of justice. Its requirement to build and comply with a Carens
Market would not be refuted. I take this to show the following rather
significant thing: even if a large dose of selfishness is part of human
nature, this does not refute theories of justice that require people to be
less selfish than that.
What would it mean for selfishness to be not only typical but essen-
tially typical of humans?12 One possibility is that an agent does not count
as human if her motivations are otherwise. There are historical examples
of people who were extremely unselfish, such as Mother Theresa. The
objection we are considering is this: a theory that requires people to be as
unselfish as Mother Theresa is false because anyone who is that unselfish
does not count as human. But this is absurd.
vi. are prerogatives a concession to human nature?
It would be supremely difficult for many parents to surrender their infant
children to be raised by the state. Perhaps people could be socialized so
that fewer parents felt this way and so that those who did feel it did so less
intensely. Or perhaps not. I don’t want to try to resolve this, but to accept
for the sake of argument that human nature would resist such socializa-
tion and that many parents would always be unable to bring themselves
to give up their children. Few accept that justice would require that
children be raised by the state, and it may seem as though this is a
concession to human nature: humans cannot bring themselves to sur-
render their children and so, for that reason, justice does not require
it. This would be a concession to human nature of precisely the kind
I am denying.
Indeed, a similar point can be made against the Pretax Max theory
itself. To maximize pretax income, a person would have to forgo any
12. Thanks to Paulina Ochoa for discussion of this modally stronger position.
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projects that did not (directly or indirectly) contribute to that goal.
Maybe reading bedtime stories to one’s kids increases one’s productiv-
ity, but if not, it would have to be skipped. Spending a long evening over
a fancy meal, or buying a nice camera with money that could be used to
take more professional development courses would be forbidden. Isn’t it
absurd to require maximizing pretax income if that means never reading
to your children at night, or never going out to dinner with your partner,
or never buying a nice camera? Donald Moon writes, “The composer
who lives to write great music, but whose work is not appreciated, would
be failing to perform his or her social duty. The person who chooses a life
of scholarship over investment banking is morally blameworthy under
this principle. We may well wish to demand some minimal level of social
service from the composer or the scholar, but Carens’s moral incentives
seem to require far more than that.”13 Carens himself concedes the point
and proposes a revised ideal in which people are obligated to contribute
to the common good, but not necessarily as much as they can.14
Similar concerns have been pressed against highly demanding moral
theories, and many believe that it is plausible to accept, in effect, a moral
prerogative to pursue certain of one’s own ends to some extent, even
when this is not the optimal way to contribute to the agent-neutral
good.15 There are a number of different possible positions in this area.
Notice that Moon’s examples do not militate for a prerogative to do (to
some extent) just as one wishes but for a prerogative (or maybe even a
duty) to do certain things that have significant value even if they do not
maximize one’s contribution to the social product. The rationale for that
kind of prerogative might be derived from a theory of value, not from any
observation that humans, by their nature, are too self-concerned to be
13. J. Donald Moon, review of Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market, Ethics 94
(1983): 146–50, at p. 149. See the reply by Carens: “Rights and Duties in an Egalitarian
Society,” Political Theory 14 (1986): 31–49.
14. See Carens, “Rights and Duties,” p. 35.
15. Classic pieces include Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); and Shelly Kagan, “Does Consequentialism Demand Too
Much?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 13 (1984): 239–54. For some use of these issues in
political philosophy, see G. A. Cohen, “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive
Justice,” Philosophy& Public Affairs 26 (1997): 3–30; and David Estlund, “Liberalism, Equal-
ity and Fraternity in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls,” Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (1998):
99–112. See also Cohen’s replies to criticisms stemming from his granting of a “personal
prerogative,” in Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 2008), pp. 385–94.
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able to bring themselves to meet the original common-good-maximizing
requirement. There are various concerns an agent might have that might
seem to have a claim on the agent even when they conflict with some
more impartial or social good, including one’s own aims, one’s own
valuable aims, the welfare of loved ones, local duties in the context of a
family or neighborhood, and others.
Without venturing too deeply into these matters here, I will accept for
the sake of argument that Carens’s original duty—to maximize pretax
income—is refuted by reflection on the ways in which it is, as he puts it
himself, “too demanding.”16 Let’s say, then, that “ought” implies “not
unreasonably demanding.” The question for present purposes is whether
this would be a concession to human nature. More specifically, is this to
be granted on the grounds that humans (by their natures) will be unable
to bring themselves to conform to such a demanding requirement?
Carens conjectures that people might well be able to bring themselves to
conform if society has moved along a path in which they have been
properly socialized to understand and care about their duties to others in
this way.17 So, when he grants that the original duty is too demanding, it is
no concession to human nature. He says, “The kind of work that a person
finds most meaningful and important may not always be the work that
contributes most to the productive output of society. A principle that
gives absolute priority to society’s demands is too demanding.”18 In other
words, whether or not all people, or even any people, will especially value
work that is not socially optimal, any who do are permitted to pursue that
work to some extent even at some cost to the common good. What moral
basis one might give for this moral judgment is a complex and difficult
question. What matters here is that there is no indication that the reason-
ing must proceed from observations about what humans can or cannot
get themselves to do. The suggestion is not that the more partial motiva-
tions are widespread or natural but that they are morally sound or rea-
sonable, and this is a substantive moral judgment about their content.
Indeed, if the argument for a less demanding duty were to proceed
from the observed motivational incapacities of humans, it would be a
deeply troubling argument, having the following form:
16. Carens, “Rights and Duties,” p. 34.
17. See ibid., esp. pp. 103–8.
18. Ibid., p. 34.
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This tendency to partiality is what people are motivationally like, as a
matter of human nature. Therefore, requirements to be otherwise are
specious and false.
If that’s a good form of argument, then the following is a good argument:
People tend to a certain degree of cruelty, and this is part of what they
are motivationally like as a matter of human nature. (Suppose this is
so.) Therefore, requirements to be otherwise are specious and false.
That is an absurd argument. The form of argument is bad, and so no
prerogative in favor of partiality can be inferred from the fact, if it is one,
that humans are naturally partial or selfish. I conclude that if the partial-
ity of the parent is permissible when he refuses to deliver the infant to
Plato’s nursery, this is not because it is a characteristic feature of human
motivation. It must be for some other reason. Perhaps it is because the
theory of justice is flawed in other ways that undermine this aspect of it.
Or maybe there is a deep moral case that can be made for the proposition
that whether or not people are typically partial in this way, it would be
permissible for them to be so. That, manifestly, is not a principle that
depends on whether people are, in fact, like that.
I am denying that principles of political justice depend on facts about
human nature, construed specifically as facts about what people can or
can’t bring themselves to do. No such facts are requirement-blocking.
Some readers will be reminded of G. A. Cohen’s provocative argument
that all normative principles ultimately have a fact-free basis.19 I am not
committed to his more general thesis. I take no stand on whether the
search for deeper grounds will ultimately rest on facts or not. I have
argued only that facts about characteristic human motivations neither
block putative requirements of justice, nor are they the basis for what-
ever prerogatives of partiality there might be. Cohen allows that institu-
tional proposals, which he calls “rules for the regulation of society,” are
highly sensitive to facts of all kinds, and I agree. So, it might seem that
Cohen has limited the class of fact-free principles to noninstitutional
principles such as fundamental principles of justice. What I have argued
is that institutional principles, such as those that make up the Carens
Market, are not sensitive to the facts that institutional proposals would
19. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality.
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be sensitive to, such as facts about human motivational incapacity. The
important line is not between the institutional and the noninstitutional,
but between principles and proposals.
vii. circumstances of justice and strains of commitment
On one way of thinking about justice, it is, essentially, not fully ideal.
Justice is a virtue that a society might possess in light of certain circum-
stances, but which loses interest or application if those circumstances
were overcome. In the classic conception of “circumstances of justice,”
deriving from Hume and Rawls, only a society that confronts problems
such as scarcity and limited altruism confronts any questions about
justice. Should these difficulties be overcome, the issue of justice is over-
come as well. It is natural to assume that any human society will indeed
be characterized by these conditions and that justice will therefore
always be an issue. However, we may not reason the other way around:
observing the conditions we expect never to be overcome, then building
these for that reason into our conception of the circumstances of justice.
It is not because certain conditions will persist that they shape the very
idea of justice, which would oddly be to assume that injustice itself will
not similarly persist. It would also be to allow even the most evidently
justice-tainting facts, if they are likely to persist, to drag justice down to
their level. So, there is no basis in the idea of circumstances of justice for
observing (if one does) that humans, by their nature, have certain moti-
vational incapacities, and for deriving from this the conclusion that they
do not count against justice.
There remains the question whether a theory such as Pretax Max
depends on motivations that go beyond the constraints of the circum-
stances of justice, a question which is not at all settled by the supposition
that they will never, in fact, be overcome. “Limited altruism,” we can
suppose, is a circumstance of justice. But the motivations required to
meet the Pretax Max theory hardly overcome limited altruism. People
are assumed to work as productively under the egalitarian tax scheme as
they would under a less egalitarian one, but each can still be assumed to
have an interest in having more rather than less of the scarce social
goods. The change in motivations is, as compared with overcoming
limited altruism, modest, even if we might doubt that it will ever come
about. I conclude that a theory does not move beyond the circumstances
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of justice merely by depending on motivational structures that are,
owing to human nature, never going to come about.
There is a feature of Rawls’s theory of justice that is more plausibly at
odds with the view taken here. By conceiving of the principles of justice
as the outcome of an imaginary contract, Rawls finds an elegant way to
account for the conviction that the claims made on individuals by the
standards of justice should not be too demanding. In particular, if the
parties to the original position were to know of motivational incapacities
that are part of human nature (and as such not overcome in any institu-
tional setting), they could not honestly commit, as parties to a contract,
to complying with demands that conflicted with these known incapaci-
ties. If the demands of a conception of justice such as Pretax Max were
beyond human motivational capacities, then the parties would not
commit themselves to it, which means, on Rawls’s theory, that it does
not give us the correct principles of justice.20
Surely, society should not implement institutions that people will not
be able to bring themselves to comply with (assuming their value
depends on that compliance). The question is whether that is a con-
straint on the content of justice. The rules and institutions that should
be constructed given what is known about everyone’s likely com-
pliance are hardly guaranteed to be rules and institutions that qualify
a society as just.
Suppose, for example, that it is part of human nature that people who
recognize their own superior talents will tend to resent and envy people
who are, owing to the operation of social institutions, as well-off as they
are but without as much talent and ability. This resentment, suppose,
would undermine the levels of allegiance and compliance on which the
20. For Rawls’s original discussion of the strains of commitment, seeATheory of Justice,
1st ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), Section 29, pp. 153–60. In Justice
as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), the strains
of commitment might seem to be calculated by attending only to whether principles
guarantee the “fundamental interests” of people seen as free and equal citizens. See, e.g.,
p. 103. However, it is unclear how additional facts about human nature could appropriately
be kept from the parties if they were facts established (say, by science) beyond reasonable
dispute. If known, such facts might well affect which commitments the parties would
believe they could keep and so make in good faith. This challenge to the theory is serious
even if there happen to be no such troubling facts (a question I do not take up). I’m grateful
to Erin Beeghly for pressing this difficult interpretive question, and I do not take this short
note to sufficiently resolve it.
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operation of those institutions depends. Rawls, of course, would have
doubted that this is so, but his theory of justice has a distinctive response
to such hypothetical conditions nevertheless. If it were so, then the
parties should (other things being equal) reject principles that do not
tend to apportion the distribution of social goods according to levels of
talent and ability. Not only should society so apportion things under the
circumstances on Rawls’s approach, but this apportioning, according to
the Rawlsian theory, would constitute the content of perfect social
justice. It is this last point that is the crucial and, I believe, damaging one.
The implausibility does not lie in the suggestion that in such unfortunate
conditions there might be important reasons to accommodate those
untoward but ineluctable motivational constraints.21 But what institu-
tions a society should implement given such practical constraints can
hardly be thought to deliver the content of the idea of social justice.22 As
I say, I am not relying on Cohen’s sweeping argument that Rawls goes
wrong by letting justice depend on any facts whatever. Whether or not
that is correct, it is doubtful that the content of social justice is sensitive
in this way to untoward motivational features of people. Rawls’s doctrine
of strains of commitment in his contractual framework silences con-
cerns about whether some motivational structures—however much
they might be part of our natures—might be justice-tainting rather
than justice-shaping.23
21. See ibid. Cohen’s distinction between principles of justice and rules for the regula-
tion of society is a perspicuous way of thinking of this distinction. The distinction figures
throughout the book but is introduced in the first few pages.
22. Patrick Tomlin criticizes Rawls’s position on envy in a way similar to what I am
suggesting. According to Tomlin, either justice is shaped by the morally unfortunate fact of
envy, which Rawls finds unacceptable, or the original position method fails to deliver the
content of justice. See “Envy, Facts and Justice: A Critique of the Treatment of Envy in
Justice as Fairness,” Res Publica 14 (2008): 101–16.
23. Cohen’s more sweeping thesis is less plausible (though maybe still correct) than this
more limited argument. Letting justice be shaped by at least some facts is not initially
troubling in the way that it is troubling to let justice be shaped by certain apparently
justice-tainting facts such as the sort of talent-supremacist motivations I hypothesize. The
approach taken here depends on identifying some subset of facts as justice-tainting, a
larger project I will not attempt here. In effect, I believe this approach is suggested by
Cohen’s earlier work (though later abandoned) about how a Rawlsian theory seems forced
to let selfish (and thus, presumably, justice-tainting) behavior by the “talented” dull the
egalitarian edge of principles of justice. See G. A. Cohen, “Incentives, Inequality, and
Community,” in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. 13, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992), reprinted in Rescuing Justice and Equality.
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The human nature constraint, as I stated it, is a universal generali-
zation and is refuted if there are any motivational features of humans
by nature that are not (or would not be), as such, constraints on the
content of justice. I have argued that certain motivational features that
are themselves moral defects are counterexamples of that kind. Strictly,
this leaves open the possibility that some other characteristically
human motivational features do, as such, constrain the content of
justice. However, I take the counterexamples to refute that possibility
as well. So, there is a weaker human nature constraint that I have also
tried to refute, which says that at least sometimes a motivational fea-
ture’s status as characteristic of humans by nature constrains the
content of justice. I have argued that, on the contrary, it is never a fea-
ture’s status as characteristic of humans by nature that constrains the
concept of justice, since a judgment is also required in every case about
whether the feature’s moral value or significance suits it to have this
kind of weight.24
Limited altruism, as I have said, is plausibly among the circumstances
of justice. The ideas of justice and injustice only have application for
beings of such a kind. So, justice cannot coherently call for the elimina-
tion of limited altruism. It takes it for granted. However, this does not
mean that justice capitulates to the existence of limited altruism in
human nature. Facts about human nature are not determining the
content of requirements of justice even in this case. Rather, since justice
has no application except in circumstances of limited altruism, if
24. It is often suggested that the putative requirements of highly idealized theory of the
kind under discussion here must not count as normative because they are not “action-
guiding.” I assume that there is no doubt about the normativity of the moral duty that
Professor Procrastinate has to accept the assignment and write the review. So, that norma-
tivity is apparently to count as sufficiently action-guiding, even though that duty has
nothing to offer about what, under the circumstances in which he is not going to write the
review, he ought to do. It is action-guiding at one level: he ought to accept and perform. It
might fairly be said not to be action-guiding on another level: ought he to accept if he will
not perform? But this would never be held to count against the very existence of the duty to
accept and perform, and so it is granted to be action-guiding in whatever way may be
demanded of normative statements. In that case, there’s no problem about the action-
guiding-ness of the Pretax Max theory of justice, which is structurally the same: society is
required to build and comply with certain institutions. This is action-guiding, just as the
professor’s duty is. Obviously, showing that some putative requirement is no guidance with
respect to some choices hardly shows that it fails tout court to be action-guiding in the way
that is constitutive of normative considerations.
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humans were not that way (i.e., for any beings that are not that way),
justice would fail to apply to them. The content of justice, however,
might—for all that is implied by the points about circumstances of
justice—precede any facts about what humans or any beings happen to
be like, including whether limited altruism is part of their nature.
viii. a human justice
We aren’t looking for an account of justice for martians or angels but for
humans. One often hears this observation used against moral or political
theory that would only be satisfied if people were different. The idea
seems to be that if we want to understand justice-for-humans, then we
must ground it in the nature of humanity. If that’s right, then I must be
stuck with a justice that is not justice-for-humans, since I deny that
justice should be grounded in human nature. But, while I may be stuck
with an account of justice according to which people, owing to human
nature, will not bring about justice, that hardly shows that the theory
isn’t about what justice would be for humans. Human justice might well
be something that human societies will fall short of. What makes it
justice-for-humans is simply that it applies to them and is normative
for them. If they ought to meet certain principles, then those are
principles-for-them.
By eschewing any foundation of justice or morality in human nature,
my approach shares something significant with Kant’s moral philoso-
phy. Kant is rather vehement that morality is grounded not in human
nature, but in rationality. Imperfectly rational beings (unlike nonrational
beings) are subject to requirements or imperatives stemming from
reason, and among these is the categorical imperative, the fundamental
principle of morality. Since humans are imperfectly rational beings, they
are subject to moral imperatives. So, morality, whatever else it is, is
morality for humans. It might also be morality for martians, if there are
any and they are imperfectly rational beings. So, observing that we want
an account of morality-for-humans or justice-for-humans offers no par-
ticular support for the idea that morality or justice must be constrained
by human nature. Kant writes, “we must not let ourselves think of
wanting to derive the reality of [the principle of all duty] from the special
property of human nature. For, duty is to be practical unconditional
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necessity of action therefore (to which alone an imperative can apply at
all) and only because of this be also a law for all human wills.”25
Putting my thesis in Kantian terms, those to whom we owe justice do
not lose their claim on us just because it might turn out that we are not,
perhaps even by our nature, disposed to deliver it. Our own will is no
more authoritative over the content of the requirements of justice than
theirs is. They are just as “legislative” as we are.
ix. is human nature excusing?
One kind of defense of behavior that is caused by a motivational inca-
pacity or difficulty is, as we have seen, to hold that the motivational
structure (say, one that is not perfectly impartial) is substantively sound
or reasonable. This seems to be what Carens has in mind by saying, “A
principle that gives absolute priority to society’s demands is too
demanding.”26 Perhaps such a case could be made in defense of the
reluctance to surrender a child to the state, though how typical the reluc-
tance is would not be directly to the point since some unreasonable
motivations might be common or even natural. A different kind of
defense can be illustrated with the example of the Skywalk at the Grand
Canyon. This horseshoe-shaped glass-bottomed structure extends out
from the edge of the canyon at a point that is four thousand feet above
the river. Needless to say, some people will never want to go near it, and
some who do won’t be able to bring themselves to walk out onto it.
Suppose someone could only save some lives by crossing such a high
glass bridge, but can’t bring themselves to do it. Is that motivational
incapacity requirement-blocking? Should we say that they are not
morally required to save those lives because they are unable to bring
themselves to do it? If so, might human nature block requirements of
justice in a similar way? The challenge for my argument is this: if the glass
bridge case is requirement-blocking, then why aren’t motivational inca-
pacities generally requirement-blocking?
What is relatively clear is that the fear of heights mitigates the agent’s
liability to blame to some extent, which means that there might be
25. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Vol. 4 of the Academy edition, p. 425.
This translation is from Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanual Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 76.
26. Carens, “Rights and Duties,” p. 34.
230 Philosophy & Public Affairs
similar mitigation in contexts of injustice due to human nature. This, a
plea for excuse, would be the second kind of defense of behavior owed to
motivational incapacity (the first being to argue that the motivations are
substantively sound or reasonable). Even without trying to say which
motivations are excusing and which are not, two points about this line of
defense are important here.
First, even when certain motivations are excusing, this is still no basis
for thinking that the mitigation or excusatory power is owed to their
being widespread or part of human nature. Recall the line of people
behind Bill pleading unsuccessfully (so I claimed) that their acts were
justified (not merely excused). If Bill moves over to another queue, to
plead only for excuse, his case is not strong or weak depending on how
many people line up behind him ready to make the same plea. If a
certain fear of heights excuses the failure to step onto the glass bridge as
required, this is so whether or not anyone else (or all other humans)
suffer from the same fear. Human nature, in the sense under discussion
in this article, is not germane. Just as I argued in the case of justification,
letting excuses be set by human nature would rely on an abhorrent
principle that would excuse cruelty or bigotry if only they are character-
istic or natural.27
Second, the category of excused acts includes acts that are not justi-
fied.28 They remain wrong even as the agent’s liability to blame is miti-
gated. For example, you might not be to blame if it is a fear of heights that
kept you from saving someone, but that doesn’t justify it. In our termi-
nology, it isn’t requirement-blocking. The morally requiring reasons
remain in place, and a properly oriented agent will continue to appreci-
ate them. It is allowed, by the appeal to excuses, that the requirements of
justice are still not bent or relaxed by excusing or mitigating factors such
as motivational incapacities. In that case, my thesis stands unchal-
lenged: requirements of social justice are not blocked by facts (if there
27. It is important to remember here that the characteristics’ being natural—meaning
characteristic of humans as such (perhaps only as a statistical fact, such as right-
handedness)—would not entail that it is beyond agents’ ability to refrain. If that were the
case, it would suggest an entirely different line of justification or excuse, and I’ve granted
for the sake of argument that it might succeed.
28. There is dispute about whether an act can be both justified and excused, but that
doesn’t affect my claim that not all excused acts are justified. For a recent argument that all
justified acts are excused but not vice versa, see Mark McBride, “Justifications and Excuses:
Mutually Exclusive?” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (June 2011). <www.jesp.org>.
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are any) about human motivational incapacities. That is not rebutted
even if the failures are, to whatever extent, excused.29
Many will ask: but then, who cares what justice requires if failures are
(supposing, for the sake of argument) excused and thus not blamewor-
thy?30 The answer, I believe, is that the agent must care. If the failure to
save someone out of a fear of heights is excusing, then presumably the
agent will have been motivated (incompletely, of course) by the morally
requiring reasons. In this case, for example, we might say that the requir-
ing reason is the fact that you could save an innocent life with very little
cost to yourself.31 If the agent is not motivated by this consideration, then
it is not true that what has prevented him from acting is his fear of
heights. When we say that the agent’s failure was caused by his fear of
heights, we seem to be assuming that the cause is not any failure to
appreciate the moral reasons to act. Were there such a failure, the fear of
heights, even if present and sufficient to cause inaction, would not be
excusing. A morally proper practical orientation involves a proper moti-
vational engagement with moral reasons for action (including any
requiring reasons). The fact that a failure to act as required might yet be
excused, in some cases, by such things as a fear of heights does nothing
to delete the role of the morally requiring reasons in a morally proper
practical orientation. Facts about what is morally required, or required
by social justice, do not fade to irrelevance just because an agent, or even
human agents generally, are, to whatever extent, excused for failures to
do as required. The question of what justice requires remains important.
And it would be a moral deficiency in any agent subject to those require-
ments (whatever excuses might or might not come into play) if they did
not care what justice required.
We can allow that a fear of walking on the glass bridge can be excus-
ing, because it doesn’t necessarily indicate a morally improper practical
29. On the distinction between excuse and justification, see Paul Woodruff, “Justifica-
tion or Excuse: Saving Soldiers at the Expense of Civilians,” supplement, Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 2 (1982): 159–76; and Marcia Baron, “Justifications and Excuses,” Ohio State
Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2004–2005): 387–406.
30. I am indebted in what I say in this paragraph to Nomy Arpaly, “Moral Worth,”
Journal of Philosophy 99 (2002): 223–45, which is also chapter 3 of her Unprincipled Virtue:
An Inquiry Into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
31. Some will deny there is a requirement of that sort. Add, if you like, that you happen
to be specially responsible, for some reason, for the person’s safety. The precise form of this
requirement doesn’t matter for present purposes.
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orientation even though it sometimes leads to morally wrong acts. There
are variants of such a fear, however, that are morally more troubling.
Suppose that you cannot bring yourself to cross to save an innocent
person, but you can do so to save any cat. Or you can bring yourself to
cross but only to save someone of your own race. Either of these might
indicate morally deficient motivations in a way that a more general fear
of heights does not. The fact that a failure to cross was produced by a fear
of heights does not ensure that the agent is excused.
In the case of social justice, we must similarly recognize that even if
some failures produced by motivational incapacities are excused, many
are not. How much partiality is compatible with a morally proper prac-
tical orientation, for example, is something I am leaving open, except in
my insisting that there is such a thing as too much. Consider cases in
which social justice is not met, even though it is within a society’s abili-
ties to do so, because people can’t bring themselves to do what is
needed. In principle, this failure might be entirely excused since it is
possible that there is no morally inappropriate orientation to the moral
reasons. Even in the case that the failure is excused, however, the stan-
dard of justice is unbowed. And that standard remains important too, as
something that must matter to moral agents even if they might, in the
end, be excused for failures. But, of course, the failure to meet the stan-
dards of social justice might not even be excused, since it might be owed
to a morally improper orientation to the relevant standards and reasons.
This might indeed give rise to motivational incapacities, but they would
not, in that case, be excusing. If people can’t bring themselves to do as
social justice would require, then, while it might be that they are properly
motivated by reasons of social justice but excused by something akin to
a general fear of heights, it might instead be the case that they are not. It
might be that their motivational incapacity is owed to a morally
improper indifference to the legitimate interests of others. In this case,
not only do the standards of justice stand, condemning the society as
unjust, but in addition, the society is fully to blame (i.e., not excused)
for the injustice, since no excusatory motivational incapacities
explain the failure.
Some typical human motivational inabilities, such as the parental
bond, might excuse certain kinds of failure to do as justice (nevertheless)
requires, even if they don’t justify (a question I am not addressing). Even
if so, this would not refute the theory of justice that claims that the
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surrendering is morally required. Perhaps, of course, it can be refuted
on other grounds.
What about people’s motivational incapacity—supposing there was
one—to work as productively under the egalitarian tax system as they
would under a system that allowed the more able and talented to have
more posttax money? Is this morally like the person who could not bring
himself to walk on the glass bridge to save anyone, including his own
beloved son? In the bridge case, the motivational structure probably
strikes us as an excusing condition. It is, however, rather different from
the doctor who can’t bring himself to work an extra four hours a week in
order to help an extra dozen patients, even though he would have
worked that long and more if only he were paid slightly more—and more
than others. In any case, that is the question.
It might be tempting even to deny that it is a motivational incapacity
at all rather than just a simpler unwillingness to do as justice requires.32
For my purposes, I am willing to let my opponent have that description
of the case as a motivational incapacity. Even if that is granted, it is far
from clear that it has excusing power (much less requirement-blocking
power), since it’s far from clear that it doesn’t reflect poorly on the moral
quality of the agent’s motivations in justice-destroying ways. This is the
question that is illegitimately silenced by supposing that justice takes
motivational incapacities as given and shapes itself around them. Some
motivational incapacities, if sufficiently widespread, and even if they
were to characterize all humans by nature, undermine the very possibil-
ity of anything that deserves to be called social justice. To use Cohen’s
distinction again, principles of justice would differ from the most advis-
able principles for the regulation of society in that case by consisting in
principles for the regulation of society that would be advisable if (at least)
conditions weren’t characterized by justice-damaging individual
motivational incapacities.
Even if some motivational incapacities are excusing, this does not
make them justifying, and so there are moral standards that survive
intact. None of this would be affected by how widespread or natural the
incapacities might be. Other motivational incapacities are not even
excusing, much less justifying, since they reflect a morally deficient
structure of concerns. Again, they would not become excusing, much
32. I thank Thomas Nagel for this observation.
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less justifying, simply by being widespread or even natural. It remains
open to argue that political theories that demand more than we expect
people, in appropriate numbers, ever to comply with have specious
requirements because, say, they require an unreasonable degree of
impartiality or sacrifice. So, the view defended here is not essentially a
kind of moral rigorism. It all depends on what grounds might be supplied
for less strenuous moral requirements. My argument is meant to show
not only that there would be no support in mere statistical facts about
how people do or might act, but that even appeals to natural motiva-
tional incapacity would not be decisive. The question is whether or
not those incapacities are, for all their naturalness, forms of morally
deficient will or concern. Vicious, or complacent, or selfish concerns
are not somehow morally sanitized if they should happen to be
characteristic of humans.
x. ability and excuse in individuals and collectives
We have been considering questions of individual excuse for failures to
do what social justice requires. It is important to be clear about the
relations between excuse and justification on the individual level on one
hand and on the social level on the other. Social justice is a moral stan-
dard for societies and, strictly speaking, not for individuals. An individual
cannot be characterized by any distribution of social goods or any insti-
tutional arrangement, and these are among the sorts of things that are
assessed by standards of social justice. Requirements of social justice
morally require things of societies as such. Obviously, whether a society
meets certain standards will depend on how the society’s members act.
It is required, in the nonmoral sense, that they act in certain ways if
society is to be just. There is an ambiguity in saying that individuals are
required by social justice to act or refrain in certain ways. On one
meaning, this is to say that a society’s justice depends on how individuals
act. This is not a moral judgment. On another meaning, it is to say that
individuals are morally required to act in certain ways by standards of
social justice. That is not settled by facts of the first kind. Individuals may
be under certain moral requirements to promote or comply with stan-
dards of social justice (even though standards of social justice don’t
apply directly to them, but to societies), but that is not a question I will be
considering in any detail. I have, however, been assuming, quite blandly
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I hope, that for any plausible standard of social justice, some morally bad
individual behaviors, if sufficiently widespread, would entail that society
fails to meet standards of social justice. This leaves open what moral
requirements on individuals, if any, stem in some way from standards
of social justice.
I have assumed that societies as such are not required to do anything
they cannot do. The idea of ability, or what an agent can or could do, is
familiar in the case of individual agents, but less so for collective agents
such as societies themselves. I assume:
The ability bridge principle: Meeting some standard is within a
society’s abilities only if any individual behaviors that would be
necessary if society is to meet that standard are within those
individuals’ abilities.
So, a moral requirement of social justice would be blocked if individuals
could not behave in the necessary ways, because in that case society is
unable to meet the standard. The principle that “ought” implies “can,” in
this sense, I take to apply at the collective level.
Of course, if individuals won’t behave in the necessary ways, society
won’t meet the standard. I have argued, however, that even if people
won’t do something, that doesn’t imply that they can’t. Moreover, even if
people can’t will the act or bring themselves to do it, that doesn’t imply
that people can’t do it. So, while society can’t do something if people
can’t do what would be necessary, the mere fact that people won’t do it
or can’t will it (i.e., bring themselves to do it) does not imply that society
can’t do what is putatively required, because it doesn’t show that people
can’t do what would be necessary. Showing that people can’t bring
themselves to do something is not yet to show that they are unable to do
that thing, and its relevance for refuting standards of justice is blunted
in that way.
The ability bridge principle supplies the needed bridge between indi-
vidual and collective ability, with its implications for requirements at the
collective level. I turn next to excuse at the individual and collective
levels. My central concern is standards of justice that apply to societies
rather than moral standards that apply to individuals. Still, the question
of morally excused individual behavior is important for the following
reason. While I leave open whether a society’s injustice is itself ever
excused, I am assuming at least:
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The excuse bridge principle: If society’s injustice is produced by indi-
vidual behaviors that are morally wrong and not excused, then the
social injustice is also wrong and not excused.
If the individual failures are not excused, then the social failure is not
excused (though I take no stand on the converse proposition). Now, if
society should fail to meet a standard of justice because of excusable
individual failures, then perhaps society’s failure is excused. I also take
no stand on this question, since it is no challenge to my main thesis, that
requirements of social justice are not refuted by motivational incapaci-
ties even if these happen to be owing to human nature. First, even if the
incapacities are excusing at the individual level, this would not be owed
to their being widespread or even natural (as I have argued). Second,
even if individual excusable failures render the social failure excusable,
the moral requirement of social justice stands unchallenged. And third,
it is important to emphasize that many familiar individual motivational
incapacities are not even excusing, much less justifying. Much of the
behavior whose alleged ubiquity in human life is held against high stan-
dards of social justice is simply selfish, or bigoted, or otherwise power-
less to excuse failures to act as social justice would require whether or
not they are owed to human nature. By the excuse bridge principle stated
above, the social failure would not be excused either.
xi. conclusion
Justice-for-humans could, in principle, set standards that are beyond
human nature. It might require things that, while not beyond the abili-
ties of societies or their members, are nevertheless beyond what indi-
viduals can, in virtue of human nature, bring themselves to do. Even if
these motivational incapacities should be excusing, which (emphati-
cally) is not guaranteed, the results would still fail to meet moral stan-
dards that matter to properly oriented agents. If we are more optimistic
about human nature than this, that would still be no defense of the
theoretical approach to justice that would bend the standards of justice
to whatever unfortunate motivational incapacities humans might turn
out to have.
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